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SOME LEADING ENGLISH CASES ON TRADE
AND LABOR DISPUTES.
As a result of competition and rivalry in business, or as
a result of the efforts of associations of laborers or ass,-
ciations of capitalists to advance the interests of their mem-
bers, acts which injure others are constantly done by indi-
viduals or associations. We have an increasing number of
cases in which the courts have attempted to distinguish
between what a man may and what he may not lawfully do
in the furtherance of what he believes to be his own
business interests or the economic interest of the class to
which he belongs. A convenient name for this class of cases,
one at least which distinguishes them from those dealing
with commercial law, is to speak of them as cases dealing
with economic conflicts. Among the large number of cases
properly falling under this class are those which relate to
civil liability for interference in the trade relations of others.
The means employed by the defendant to accomplish this
interference may be a written or spoken statement defama-
tory of the plaintiff's character or methods of business. In
such cases the civil wrong, if any, is slander or libel. With
wrongs of this character this paper does not deal.
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There are other means, however, which may be employed
to injure the business of one's rival in trade or one's enemy
in a labor dispute. Those with whom they deal may be per-
suaded not to deal any longer with them, or even to break
their contracts with them, by other means than the libelous
publication or the slanderous statement; they may also be
persuaded by argument, by the offer of something of pecu-
niary value, by the threat of business loss, or by the threat
of physical harm to person or property." It is the object
of this paper to examine those English cases, beginning
with Lumley v. Gye, which discuss the civil liability of one
person for injury to another, when the immediate cause of
the injury is the refusal of some third person to deal with
the plaintiff, or a breach of contract by a third person, the
third person having been induced to act as he did, either
by an offer on the part of the defendant of something of
pecuniary value, or by the defendant's threat of business
loss.
It will be noticed that within the limits indicated, four
questions can be discussed.
First: Has A. an action against B., if B., by means
of an offer to C. of something of pecuniary value,
induces C. to break his contract with A.?
Second: Has A. an action against B. if B. induces
C. to break a contract with A. by threats of business
loss?
Third: Has A. an action against B., if B., by means
of an offer to C. of something of pecuniary value,
induces C. not to make a contract with A. that he would
otherwise have made?
Fourth: Has A. an action against B., if B. induces
C., by threats of business loss, not to make a contract
with A. which he would otherwise have made?
The attempt to indicate how far these questions have been
answered by the English courts, leads us to an examination
of four cases well known to the profession in this country.
The earliest is Lumley v. Gye,2 which was afterwards con-
' This analysis of the methods of persuasion is not necessarily ex-
haustive.
22 E. & B. 215, 1853.
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firmed by the Court of Appeal in Bowen v. Hall.8 The
three other cases are: Mogul Steamship Company v. Mac-
Gregor,4 Temperton v. Russel,5 and Allen v. Flood.6 We
will also have to examine the more recent case of Quinn v.
Leathem;- a case which may soon become almost as famous
as any of the others.
The facts of Lumley v. Gye are simple. Miss Wagner
was an opera singer. She contracted with Lumley to sing
under his management for a period of three months. Gye,
a rival operatic manager, persuaded her to leave Lumley,
before the expiration of the term for which she was em-
ployed, and sing for him, Gye. For this persuasion, with
its resulting injury, Lumley sued Gye. The Court of
Queen's Bench declared by a vote of three to one that he
had a cause of action. It will be noticed that this case
involves the first of our four questions, and apparently
answers it in the affirmative. There is the contract between
Lumley and Wagner which Gye induces Wagner to break
by the offer to her of something of pecuniary value, that is
a position at his theatre. But a perusal of the case as
reported shows us that the first question as we have stated
it was not argued by counsel or considered by any of the
four judges. At the time the case was decided the action
for enticing a man's servant away from his service was well
known. If Miss Wagner, under the decided cases of this
class, could be regarded as the servant of Lumley, his cause
of action was clear. One of the plaintiff's counts is drawn
on this theory, and one of the three judges who voted for
the plaintiff, Sir Charles Crompton, rests his opinion solely
on this ground, while a second, Sir William Wightman,
regards it as sufficient for the decision, and Sir John T. Cole-
ridge, who dissented, devotes a considerable part of his
opinion to proving that Miss Wagner was not the servant
of the plaintiff. If from this point of view the decision is
much narrower than the scope of our first question, the
16 Q. B. D. 333, I88i.
'23 Q. B. D. 598, 1889; Aff. (I892) A. C. 21.
(1893) x Q. B. 715.
(x898) A. C. 3.
(igoi) A. C. 495. The only other case of importance to be ex-
amined is Lyons v. Wilkins (i896) i Ch. 81x.
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plaintiff's second count and the way it was treated by at
least two of the judges brings up a much wider question.
The plaintiff declares: "That he had contracted and agreed
with Johanna Wagner to perform in the theatre for a certain
time. . . . Yet defendant, well-knowing the premises,
and maliciously intending to injure the plaintiff
whilst the agreement with Wagner was in force, and before
the expiration of the term, enticed and procured Wagner
to refuse to perform.
It is evident from the language used that in the mind of
the pleader, the intent to injure the plaintiff, the malice, is
the element which gives to the defendant's act the character
of a civil wrong. Given this malice the method employed
to persuade Miss Wagner was unimportant. All the judges,
except Sir Charles Crompton, agree with counsel at least to
the extent of regarding the question before them as being,
whether B. is civilly liable to A. if he induces C., with the
desire to injure A., or to benefit himself at A.'s expense, to
break his contract with A. ? Two of the judges give unequiv-
ocal affirmative answers to this question. Thus, Sir William
Erle regards the rule making one man liable for enticing
the servant of another from his employment as resting
"upon the principle that the procurement of the violation
of the right is a cause of action, ' '8 and he further affirms
that: "He who maliciously procures a damage to another
by violation of his right ought to be made to indemnify;
and that, whether he procures an actionable wrong or a
breach of contract." So also to the same effect is the
opinion of Sir William Wightman. He says: "It was
undoubtedly prima facie an unlawful act on the part of Miss
Wagner to break her contract, and, therefore, a tortious act
of the defendant maliciously to procure her to do so.
-10 Even Sir Charles Crompton, who put the case
solely on the ground that Miss Wagner was the servant of
Lumley, said that he by no means wished to be considered
as holding "that the larger ground" is not tenable, "or as
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an action maintainable for maliciously inducing another to
break a contract to the injury of the person with whom such
contract has been made."11 It is to be noted that the intent
of the defendant to profit by the plaintiff's loss is not stated
as the sole ground of the action. The fact that the act
procured to be done was illegal is emphasized. It is also
true that the case before the court was a case in which the
method used was the offer to Miss Wagner of "something
of pecuniary value," or in other words a bribe; but this fact
is not adverted to by any of the judges composing the ma-
jority. We must.conclude, therefore, that in their minds
they were deciding what the reporter states in his syllabus of
the case: "That the action would lie for the malicious pro-
curement of the breach of any contract . . . if by the
procurement damage was intended to result and did result to
the plaintiff." The two elements which make the act of
Gye wrongful are his intent to injure, and the wrongful
nature of the act which he persuaded Miss Wagner to do.
Both elements seem to be equally essential. Yet Sir John T.
Coleridge, in his celebrated dissent, assumes that the ma-
jority regarded the existence of the selfish intent to benefit
himself as the sole element which made his act wrongful.
In the course of his argument he puts three cases: "If a
contract has been made between A. and B. that the latter
should go supercargo for the former on a voyage to China,
and C., however maliciously, persuades B. to break his con-
tract, but in vain, no one, I suppose, would contend that any
action would lie against C. On the other hand, suppose a
contract of the same kind made between the same parties to
go to Sierra Leone, and C. urgently and bona fide advises
B. to abandon his contract, which on consideration B. does,
whereby loss results to A.; I think no one will be found bold
enough to maintain that an action would lie against C.
. . . If so, let malice be added, and let C. have per-
suaded, not bona fide but male fide and maliciously, still,
all other circumstances remaining the same, the same reason
applies; for it is malitia sine damno if the hurtful act is
I Page 229.
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entirely and exclusively B.'s, which last circumstance can-
not be affected by the presence or absence of malice in C.""
The case of Lumley v. Gye was a decision of the Queen's
Bench. In view of Sir J. T. Coleridge's dissent, and the
discussion which the decision invoked among the profession,
it was by no means certain that the larger principle con-
tended for by Sir William Erle and Sir William Wightman
would be adopted by the higher courts. In i88i, the case of
Bowen v. Hall" came before the Court of Appeal. The
facts of this last case are almost identical with Lumley
v. Gye, except that it was hardly possible to consider
the person who was "persuaded" by the defendants to
break his contract with the plaintiff as the servant of the
plaintiff. In this last case, C. had exclusive knowledge of
a certain process for making glazed bricks. C. contracted
to supply A. with the bricks he needed for a period of five
years, and not, during that period to supply anyone else.
B. and the other defendant D. induced C. to break his con-
tract with A. and manufacture bricks for B. Sir William
Brett, afterwards Lord Esher, speaking also for Lord
Chancellor Selborne, ignores the fact that the act which the
third person was persuaded to do was a civil wrong to the
plaintiff, and places the liability of the defendant solely on
his selfish intent. In other words, he takes the same attitude
towards the question involved, as that taken by Sir J. T.
Coleridge in Lumley v. Gye, and comes to a diametrically
opposite conclusion. He says: "Merely to persuade a per-
son to break his contract, may not be wrongful in law or
fact as in the second case put by Coleridge, J. But if the
persuasion be used for the indirect purpose of injuring the
" Page 247. As illustrating the impropriety of drawing a line between
an act done with an evil intent, and one which is done with a good
intent, he points out that to distinguish between "advice, persuasion,
enticement and procurement is practically impossible in a court of
justice;" as "who shall say how much of a free agent's resolution
flows from the interference of other minds, or the independent resolu-
tion of his own." See page 252. When he here speaks of advice, per-
suasion, etc., it is evident from the last sentence quoted that he is
thinking only of argument, and it never occurred to him that, how-
ever ill founded as a legal distinction, there is no practical impossi-
bility in drawing a line between persuasion by argument and persuasion
by the offer of money or a thing of value.
" 6 Q. B. D. 333, I88i.
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plaintiff, or of benefiting the defendant at the expense of the
plaintiff, it is a malicious act which is in law and fact a
wrong act." And he adds: "The act complained of in such
a case as Lumley v. Gye, and which is complained of in the
present case, is therefore, because malicious, wrongful."' 4
Lord Chief Justice Coleridge, the son of that Sir J. T. Cole-
ridge who had dissented in Lumley v. Gye asserts in his
dissenting opinion that he does not know except in the
former case, "that it has ever been held that the same per-
son for doing the same thing under the same circumstances
with the same result is actionable or not actionable accord-
ing to whether his inward motive was selfish or unselfish
for what he did."'15 Nevertheless, the case taken in connec-
tion with the opinion, unquestionably stands for the proposi-
tion, that in actions for inducing a breach of contract
between the plaintiff and a third person, the law will com-
bine a damage which is not in itself actionable to a motive
which is not in itself actionable, and form a cause of action
out of the combination. 16
We next turn to the celebrated case of Mogul Steamship
Company v. MacGregor.17  A number of steamship lines
were in the habit of running regular steamers to Shanghai
and other China ports. During the tea exporting season
the China freights are larger and more remunerative than
at other times in the year. The Mogul Steamship Company
was in the habit of sending boats to Shanghai, and even to
Hankow, six hundred miles up the Yangtse River, during
the tea exporting season, but did not run a regular line to
these ports. The other companies formed an association
for the purpose of securing for themselves the monopoly of
the China trade. In furtherance of this object they issued
a circular, in which they stated that all shippers who con-
fined their shipments to the boats belonging to the members
14 Page 338. In the last part of his opinion Brett, L. J., admits that
the reasoning of Sir 3. T. Coleridge in Lumley v. Gye, to the effect that
Miss Wagner was not the servant of Lumley within the meaning of
the old action for enticing my servant "is as nearly as possible, if not
quite, conclusive." See page 340.
Page 344.
Restated from the opinion of Chief Justice Coleridge, page 343.
1Y23 Q. B. D. 598, Aff. (1892) A. C. 25.
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of the association would receive a rebate of five per cent. on
the published rates of freight. They also determined, that
whenever any company, not in the association, sent a boat
to Hankow, the association would also send one or more
boats, and there offer to take freight at any rate low enough
to prevent their rival from securing a cargo. The Mogul
Company complained that this policy was carried out to
their injury, for which injury they brought suit. The
action was tried before Lord Chief Justice Coleridge with-
out a jury. He gave judgment for the defendants on the
ground that the plaintiff had no cause of action. This
judgment was affirmed in the Court of Appeal by a divided
court, but afterwards unanimously affirmed by the House of
Lords.
It will be noticed that the case falls under our Third Ques-
tion. The association, by means of an offer to shippers of
something of pecuniary value, that is an offer to carry
freight, induced shippers not to ship by the plaintiff's boat.
The principal opinion is that of Sir Charles Bowen in the
Court of Appeal. He practically starts with the following
proposition: "Intentionally to do that which is calculated
in the ordinary course of events to damage, and which does,
in fact, damage another in that other person's property or
trade, is actionable if done without just cause or excuse."18
He admits that in the case before him the defendants should
be held liable unless they have this "just cause and excuse,"
which, however, he finds in the defendants' right to carry
on their own trade in the manner which suits them best,
subject to certain limitations. These limitations he con-
fines to the use of fraud, violence or "the violation of indi-
vidual rights, contractual or other."
In reply to the argument of the plaintiff's counsel, that
the element of combination among the defendants made
their acts wrongful even though they would not have been
wrongful if committed by a single individual, he points out
that you must either show an agreement to do an unlawful
act, or an agreement to do a lawful act by unlawful means;
and that to do this in the present case the plaintiff must
prove that the defendants did something to the injury of the
W23 Q. B. D. 613.
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plaintiff's business without just cause or excuse. What is
just cause and excuse where many traders are acting
together is, in his opinion, the same question, as what is
just cause and excuse when the act which results in injury
is the act of a single trade. 19
Lastly, in reply to the argument that the defendants are
liable because their acts are illegal, being in restraint of
trade, he takes the position, that contracts in restraint of
trade are not illegal, merely non-enforceable between the
parties, and certainly no action at common law will lie by
third persons against those who enter into such contracts.
20
This opinion in practically every particular was adopted
by the members of the House of Lords,21 though there the
judges start with the assumption, that as the object of the
defendants in doing what they did was to advance their own
trade, which is a legal object, the burden is on the plaintiff
to show, not only that he was injured, but injured by an
illegal act.
Lord Esher, the Master of the Rolls, in his dissent in the
Court of Appeal, puts little weight on the fact that there
was a combination among the defendants. We may, there-
fore, say that it was the unanimous opinion of the judges,
that if the acts complained of when done by one would not
be actionable, the fact that they were done by many in
combination would not make them so. In Lord Esher's
judgment the agreement between the defendants is impor-
tant as showing an effort to restrain or monopolize trade by
"Page 617. The idea that the element of combination to do an act
does not make that act wrongful if the act if done by one would not be
wrongful, is carried out by the Irish court, Exchequer Division, in
Kearney v. Lloyd, 27 Ir. 268, i8go. In that case the defendants, who
were members of a parish, agreed together that they would not sub-
scribe, as they heretofore had done, to a certain voluntary fund
for the support of the minister of the parish as long as the plaintiff
was the incumbent. As a result of this action the plaintiff had to
resign. The reason for the agreement among the defendants was their
belief that the parish would be better with another minister. The
court held that the plaintiff had no cause of action.
so23 Q. B. D. 61g.
' Opinions were delivered by Lord Chancellor Halsbury and Lords
Watson, Bramwell, Morris, Field and Hannen. Lord Macnaghten
concurred, but delivered no opinion.
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interference in the free course of trade of a trader who is
not a party to the agreement. To explain this he advances
the proposition that, it is the peculiar right of every trader
to trade according to the free course of trade. Nowhere
in his opinion does he make entirely clear what he means
by this free course of trade, yet he does indicate with rea-
sonable clearness a class of acts which are wrongful because
they interfere with this free course. He regards an act
which is done for the purpose of interfering with the plain-
tiff's trade as wrongful, and the act of the defendants in
sending a ship to Hankow as such an act. He says: "It
follows that the act of the defendants in lowering their
freights far beyond any purposes of trade-that is to say,
so low that if they continued it themselves they could not
carry on trade-was not an act done in the exercise of their
own free right of trade, but was an act done evidently for
the purpose of interfering with, i. e., with the intent to
interfere with, the plaintiff's right to a free course of trade,
and was, therefore, a wrongful act. .. .22
As he says nothing about the illegality of the rebate
offered in the defendants' circular, it may be presumed that
he regarded this method of competition as legal. Indeed,
applying the test above stated to the circular offering the
rebate, it would seem to be unobjectionable. The circular
offered to all those who would confine their business to the
defendants a rate of freight which was a remunerative rate,
though lower than that offered to shippers who did not
send all their freight by the plaintiff's boats. It is true that
the fact that the defendants were the only shippers sending
regular lines to China ports made their offer more effective;
but this additional persuasiveness of the offer was due to
the fact that the defendants were offering a better service
to the public than the plaintiff, as they sent regular boats
to China throughout the year. It is true also that the effect
of the circular was to injure the plaintiff, but if one sympa-
thizes with Lord Esher's point of view, it may be argued,
that an act done primarily to benefit the trade of the actor,
does not become illegal because its incidental effect is to
injure another trader, even though such incidental injury
=223 Q. B. D. p. 61o.
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Was expected and regarded with favor by the actor, as it
tended to drive his competitor out of business. But in the
case where the boats of the defendant followed those of the
plaintiff, with the sole object of making the adventure of
the plaintiff unprofitable, it was an act, the sole immediate
purpose of which was to injure the plaintiff; and such an
act did not become legal, merely because there was no
express malice towards the plaintiff, or because the ultimate
object was to benefit the actor. For if we have rightly
interpreted the opinion of Lord Esher, he would distinguish,
at least in matters of trade rivalry, between the immediate
and ultimate object of the actor whose act results in injury.
If the immediate object is the injury of another, and injury
results, an action will lie; but if the immediate object is
economic benefit to the actor, the mere fact that it injures
another does not of itself make the act unlawful. Rebates,
therefore, are legal, unless illegal on some totally different
theory, but to put down the price at which one sells his
commodity in a particular locality far below its cost, not
for the purpose of permanently making presents to the
community, but for the sole purpose of preventing a rival
from selling his wares, is illegal. In the game of competi-
tion, it is an act which according to Lord Esher should be
considered as against the rules of the game. This opinion,
however, did not find favor with the other judges. Lord
Watson reflects the general trend of the opinion of his
associates when he says: "I cannot for a moment suppose
that it is the proper function of the English courts of law
to fix the lowest prices at which traders can sell or hire, for
the purpose of protecting or extending their business, with-
out committing a legal wrong which will subject them to
damages. 12 3  The case, therefore, may be taken to indicate
' (1892) A. C. p. 43. It is, however, interesting to note that Attor-
ney-General Knox in his recent letter to the judicial committees of
both houses of Congress, expressly recommends that the lowering of
prices for the immediate object of rendering it impossible for a rival
to exist, i. e., exactly what was done by the defendants in the Mogul
case, when they sent a boat to Hankow, be by statute declared wrong-
ful. This recommendation has been embodied in the bill now before
Congress, known as the Littlefield Anti-Trust Bill; though at present
writing the passage of this bill by the present Congress seems unlikely,
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a negative answer to our Third Question, in all possible
cases which might be considered as falling under it, except
in the case of express malice; that is, where the sole motive
of the offer of the thing of value to the third person is ill
will towards the plaintiff. I make this exception because
such an act is expressly said to be actionable by at least two
of those who took part in the decision.
24
The contrast, between the way in which the question of
motive as indicating the nature of the act is handled in
Bowen v. Hall, and in this case, is striking. In the former
case the selfish motive of the defendant, that is his desire for
personal gain, is the essential element which makes his act
illegal; in this case this same selfish element, the desire to
advance their own trade at the expense of the plaintiff's is
considered the very element which gives just cause and
excuse for the injury inflicted. Sir Charles Bowen, how-
ever, from whom we have quoted so largely, in explaining
why the defendants had just cause and excuse, refers to
Lumley v. Gye and Bowen v. Hall with approval. The
explanation of this apparent anomaly lies in the fact,
that though he and the other judges who refer to the ques-
tion, evidently approve of the decision of Lumley v. Gye,
they do so on a really different ground from that taken by
Lord Esher, then Sir William Brett, in Bowen v. Hall. He
had the conception that if A., for malicious or selfish mo-
tives, induces C. to injure B., B. has an action against A.
But Lord Bowen says: "Intimidation, obstruction, and mo-
lestation are forbidden; so is the intentional procurement of
a violation of individual rights, contractual or other..
As an example of this last he mentions "the inducing of per-
sons under personal contracts to break their contracts. 25 To
the same effect is the opinion of Lord Chancellor Halsbury:
it probably will not be long before the courts of this country will be
called upon to determine the class of questions so strenuously objected
to by Lord Watson and his associates as improper for a judicial tri-
bunal.
"Per Lord Field (1892) A. C. p. 52, and per Sir Charles Bowen, 23
Q. B. D. 68. Other judges refuse to express their opinion as the
case was not before them. See opinions of Lord Hannen (1892) A. C.
P. 59, and Sir Edward Fry, 23 Q. B. D. p. 625.
M 23 Q. B. D. p. 614.
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"Intimidation, violence, molestation, or the procuring
people to break their contracts are unlawful acts."2 6 The
difference in attitude noted, though at first glance it may
appear slight, changes, radically, the ground on which the
earlier decision rests. The gist of the action in cases like
Lumley v. Gye is declared to be the nature of the act which
the defendant persuaded the third person to do; not the
motive which caused him to persuade. The act caused by
the persuasion being an unlawful act, the act of persuasion
becomes unlawful. The scope of the principle for which
Lumley v. Gye stands is thus in one direction widened, and
in another narrowed. Whereas, according to Sir William
Brett in Bowen v. Hall, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant acted from a selfish motive; under this last con-
ception, the defendant would be liable to the plaintiff if,
with the interest of C. at heart, he persuades C. to break his
contract with the plaintiff. In other words, the second case
put by Sir J. T. Coleridge in his dissenting opinion in Lum-
ley v. Gye is an instance of an unlawful act. On the
other hand, reading the opinion of Sir William Brett, one
wonders whether every persuasion of one man to do an act
to the detriment of another, where the motive of the per-
suasion is selfish, is an actionable wrong? If the attitude
of the judges quoted in the Mogul case is to be persisted
in, there is no doubt, that the act induced, irrespective of
the motive of the defendant, must be more than an' injury
to the plaintiff-it must be an actionable wrong; one for
which the plaintiff could sue the third person.
Within a year of the final decision of the Mogul case,
Temperton v. RusseP7 came before the Court of Appeal.
The defendants in this case were the presidents and sec-
retaries of three trade unions in Hull. The plaintiff
was a master mason in the same city. He sued for
(I) unlawfully and maliciously procuring certain per-
sons who had entered into contracts with the plaintiff to
break such contracts, and (2) for maliciously conspiring
to induce certain persons not to enter into contracts with
the plaintiff.28 The dispute which led up to this action was
" (1892) A. C. 37.
n (1893) i Q. B. 715.
'Page 716.
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one in which the plaintiff had no interest. The trade unions
of Hull desired that all employes in the building trades
should conform to certain rules of employment. One firm
refused, and in order to force this firm to comply with their
wishes, the unions desired the plaintiff, who had business
dealings with the firm, to cease dealing with them. This
the plaintiff refused to do. One of the plaintiff's regular
customers was a certain Brentano, a builder, and at the
time of the dispute the plaintiff had a contract with Bren-
tano, in which the latter had agreed to take certain building
materials from the plaintiff. In support of his action the
plaintiff introduced evidence to show that the unions threat-
ened Brentano to bring on a strike among his workmen if
he received any building materials from the plaintiff, and
that, to avoid this strike, Brentano, not only broke his con-
tract with the plaintiff, but had since, for the same reason,
refused to enter into any further business relations with him.
There was also evidence that other persons with whom the
plaintiff formerly dealt had been threatened in the same
manner, and had in consequence of these threats refused
to give him any more orders. Sir Richard Collins, before
whom the case was tried, directed the jury: "That to induce
a person who had made a contract with another to break it,
in order to hurt the person with whom it was made, to
hamper him in his trade, or to put undue pressure upon him,
or to obtain an indirect advantage, was in point of law to
do it maliciously. . 29 He also directed the jury in
substance, that a malicious conspiracy to prevent persons
from entering into contracts with another, if followed by
damage to the person conspired against, was actionable.
The jury found in favor of the plaintiff on both counts,
assessing fifty pounds damages on the first, and two hundred
pounds on the second. Judgment was given for both
amounts, and the Court of Appeal, through Lord Esher,
Sir Henry Lopes and Sir Archibald Smith, dismissed the
defendants' application for a new trial.
It will be noticed that the facts of the case and the first
count bring up our Second Question. The defendants
induced Brentano by the threat of business loss to break his
" Page 719.
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contract with the plaintiff. The case, therefore, would
appear to stand, and on its facts does stand, for an affirma-
tive answer to the second question. When we turn to the
opinions of the members of the Court of Appeal we find,
at least in those of Lord Esher and Sir Henry Lopes, as
we found the opinion of the former in Bowen v. Hall, great
emphasis laid on the intent of the plaintiff, while the method
used to persuade Brentano is merely mentioned. Thus
Lord Esher, though in his re-statement of the facts he points
out that the defendants tried to coerce Brentano, quotes,
in his discussion of the law applicable to the case, at length
from that part of his own opinion in Bowen v. Hall, in
which he says, that if the persuasion is used for the
indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiff, or of benefiting
the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff, it is a malicious
act, and because malicious, wrongful.30 So also Sir Henry
Lopes places his opinion on Bowen v. Hall, which he under-
stands has decided the broad principle, "that a person who
induces a party to a contract to break it, intending thereby
to injure another person or to get a benefit for himself,
commits an actionable wrong; ' '31 and Sir Archibald Smith,
though he also points out that the defendants used threats
of business injury against the third person to accomplish
their object, and to this extent emphasizes this element of
the case, states that "there must be evidence that the inten-
tion of the inducer was by such breach to do harm to the
other contracting party."'3 2 From the point of view of these
judges the first count in this case involves exactly the same
question as that which arose in Bowen v. Hall; the differ-
ence in the method of persuasion is immaterial; in both we
have the intent to injure the plaintiff, at least to the extent
that there was a knowledge that the act would result in
harm to the plaintiff. Indeed, in this last case there was
even a desire that the persuasion would result in harm to
the plaintiff; while in both cases harm did result. Thus
the opinions on this part of the case stand for the proposi-
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intent to induce another to conform to his wishes, to per-
suade a third person to break a contract with such other
person, even though the inducer was not actuated in what
he did by personal ill-will towards the injured person. The
fact that the defendants may have been moved to do the acts
complained of by a desire to elevate the class to which they
belonged, rather than themselves individually, was not con-
sidered by the court.
The second count was for conspiring to induce persons
not to enter into contracts with the plaintiff. It brings up our
Fourth Question, adding the element of combination among
the defendants. Brentano was induced by threats of busi-
ness loss to refrain from entering into contracts he would
otherwise have made with the plaintiff. The decision, if
not a general affirmative answer to our Fourth Question,
at least seems to stand for the proposition: That a combina-
tion of two or more persons to induce C. by threats of btisi-
ness loss to refrain from entering into a contract with A.,
which he would otherwise have entered into, is an action-
able wrong. The opinions of the two judges who deal
with this part of the case, Lord Esher and Sir Henry Lopes,
naturally lay stress on the intent to injure, not on the means
used. Thus Lord Esher says,-comparing the claim for
inducing persons to break contracts already entered into
with the plaintiff, and that for inducing persons not to enter
into contracts with the plaintiff: "I do not think the dis-
tinction can be maintained. There was the same wrongful
intent in both cases, wrongful because malicious. There
was the same kind of injury to the plaintiff." 33 So also
Sir Henry Lopes: ". . . a combination by two or more
persons to induce others not to deal with a particular indi-
vidual, or enter into contracts with him, if done with the
intention of injuring him, is an actionable wrong if damage
results to him therefrom. '3 4 It will be noticed that Lord
Esher strongly indicates his belief that the combination is
not an essential element of the wrong, while Sir Henry
Lopes deals only with the facts of the case under review,
and these facts showed a combination. If the position
"Page 728.
Page 731.
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towards conspiracy taken by the House of Lords in the
Mogul case,35 is persisted in, it would appear that Lord
Esher's practical assumption, that the element of conspiracy
among the defendants was not the essential element which
made the acts of the defendants wrongful, is correct.
The opinions of the judges in Temperton v. Russel,
especially the opinion of Lord Esher, revert to the point
of view towards the class of cases we are discussing, taken
by the same court in Bowen v. Hall. We again have the
action dependent primarily on the motive of the inducer,
rather than on the act which he persuaded the third person
to do. The point of view of Sir Charles Bowen, and the
judges who follow him in the House of Lords in the Mogul
case is ignored. There perhaps is a reason for this.
As we have seen, in the Mogul case it was said that
an action lay in cases like Lumley v. Gye, because the
inducer persuaded the third person to do an illegal act. In
the second count in Temperton v. Russel, the defendants
are not charged with inducing Brentano to do an illegal act,
but an act which he had a right to do; that is, refuse to have
further dealings with the plaintiff. If the view of Lumley
v. Gye which was taken in the Mogul case is correct, the
conclusion is inevitable, that the only ground for uphold-
ing the second count in Temperton v. Russel is the element
of combination among the defendants; yet the Mogul case
itself was a positive decision to the effect that combination
could not make an act illegal which would be legal without
such combination. As a consequence of the decision and
the opinions of the judges in Temperton v. Russel, it was
inevitable that the House of Lords should take the first
opportunity to discuss the extent to which intent in these
cases made the acts of the defendant lawful or unlawful.
This opportunity arose in the case of Allen v. Flood.
Before taking up this celebrated case a word should be
said in reference to a case in equity, Lyons v. Wilkins,
which first came before the courts in 1896.36 This case
arose out of a dispute between a union and a firm of leather
bag manufacturers. One of the measures adopted by the
See supra.
(1896) 1 Ch. 8ii.
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union to help on a strike of the firm's employes, was to
threaten Schoenthal, who was a sub-manufacturer, that
unless he ceased to work for the firm they would order a
strike of his workmen. Such a strike was indeed ordered
on Schoenthal's refusal to comply with their demands. The
action was brought on upon motion by the manufacturing
firm, J. Lyons & Sons, for an interlocutory injunction under
the Twenty-fifth Section of the Judicature Act, to restrain
the defendants, the secretary and a member of the executive
board of the union, from "unlawfully and maliciously induc-
ing or conspiring to induce persons not to enter into con-
tracts with the plaintiffs."3 7 Sir Ford North, before whom
the case was tried, issued the interlocutory injunction in
the terms prayed for,38 largely on the ground that the intent
of the defendants was to injure the plaintiff. The defend-
ants appealed to the Court of Appeal. This court confirmed
the injunction, but they altered its terms, so that the injunc-
tion should "restrain the defendants . . . from pre-
venting Schoenthal or other persons from working for the
plaintiff, by withdrawing his or their workmen from their
employment respectively."39 This change was made because,
as Sir A. L. Smith expressed it, in the general form in
which the injunction was granted by Sir Ford North, "ever-
lasting difficulties would arise as to the carrying out of it."
40
In other words, the wording of the original injunction was
too indefinite. The character of the changes made, how-
ever, is significant. Sir Ford North, in his wording, laid
stress on the "malicious inducement." He did not mention
any particular method which could not be employed, but
apparently prohibited every form of persuasion by which
third persons could be induced not to enter into contracts
with the plaintiff, provided the persuasion was malicious.
The Court of Appeal, on the other hand, omit all reference
"The 25th section (8) of the Judicature Act (x874) Stats. Ch. 66,
provides that ". . . an injunction may be granted . . . by an
interlocutory Order of the Court in all cases in which it shall appear to
the Court to be just or convenient that such Order should be made;
(1896) i Ch. p. 88.
"Page 832.
Page 835, 836.
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to malice, and confine the persuasion of third persons which
is prohibited to the withdrawing of workmen. The mere
fact that in the wording of this injunction the judges of
the appellate court saw fit to leave out all reference to
malice, does not, of course, necessarily indicate that they
did not regard malice, as Lord Esher had defined it in Tem-
perton v. Russel, to be essential to the civil wrong. Such
malice, the desire to injure the plaintiff, the defendants in
this case were shown to have had. It was, therefore,
unnecessary that it should be again proved in the violation
of the restraining order. But it is significant that even
with this malice proved they did not care to go further
than to prevent the defendant from "persuading by threats
of business loss." The case is of importance in our present
discussion, in that it is the first case in which the judges lay
any real emphasis on the method of persuasion employed
by the defendants.4 1
Before Lyons v. Wilkins had arisen, the case which we
now know as Allen v. Flood, under the name of Flood v.
Jackson, had been decided by other judges of the Court of
Appeal.42 There were two trade unions connected with the
shipbuilding trade of England. The largest was the United
Society of Boiler Makers and Iron Shipbuilders; the smaller,
the Shipwrights' Provident Union. The members of the
Shipwrights' Union worked both in iron and wood; the
Boiler Makers worked only in iron, and regarded the ship-
wrights as trespassing on their trade. Flood and Taylor
were shipwrights, who had been employed by a firm of ship-
builders, Mills & Knight. While in such employ they
worked on iron as well as wood, and in so doing incurred
the enmity of all the boiler makers. On leaving the employ
of Mills & Knight, they secured employment with the Glen-
gall Iron Company, where they were put at repairing the
woodwork on a ship named the "Sam Weller." The
majority of the workmen of the Glengall Company were
members of the Boiler Makers' Union. They were all
intensely interested in compelling the shipwrights to con-
fine themselves to woodwork, and felt incensed at the intro-
' For a further discussion of this case see, infra.
" (i895) 2 Q. B. 21.
144 CASES ON TRADE AND LABOR DISPUTES.
duction of the two strangers. They, of course, did not wish
to leave the employ of the company permanently, but they
did wish the company to discharge Flood and Taylor, and
to accomplish this last result had determined informally to
go on strike. The union to which they belonged, however,
had a rule, that unless a strike was authorized by the Execu-
tive Council, the strikers would not be entitled to strike
benefits. In order to obtain the consent of the Executive
Council, it was first necessary, when a dispute arose at any
yard, for the members to make it known to the officers of
the nearest Branch. It then became the duty of these
officers to try and settle the dispute, and if they could not, re-
fer it to the Executive Council. Thus only the Council could
order a strike. The boiler makers employed at Glengall's
sent for Allen, an officer of the London Branch. Allen
responded to the call, and on learning the nature of the
dispute said that he would "try and settle the matter" with
the company. He had an interview with the manager, a
Mr. Hallett. At this point we reach an alleged element of
doubt in the facts of the case. One version of the con-
versation is that Allen told Hallett that if he did not dis-
charge Flood and Taylor, he, Allen, would call out the
boiler makers; another version is that Allen merely stated
that there would be a strike unless this was done. There is
no doubt that Hallett believed there would be a strike, and
to avoid this, discharged at the end of the day Flood and
Taylor. In discharging Flood and Taylor the company did
not break any contract, as both were employed by the day.
At the same time, had Hallett not believed a strike immi-
nent he would have re-employed both the next day. It
should also be noted that it was apparently within the dis-
cretion of Allen, on having the cause of the trouble
explained to him, to say that he did not approve of any
action and refer the matter at once to the other officers of
the Branch. A reading of the whole case leaves one with
no doubt but that Allen sympathized with the desire of the
men to get rid of the two shipwrights, and that he was
willing to co-operate with them towards that end by seeing
the officers of the company and "trying to settle the matter,"
by pointing out to them the results of keeping Flood and
Taylor in their employ.
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The action was brought by Flood and Taylor against
Allen, the General Secretary of the Union, and the Presi-
dent of the Executive Council, "For maliciously and wrong-
fully, and with intent to injure the plaintiffs, procuring and
inducing the Glengall Iron Company to discharge them
from their employment, and not to engage or employ them
again." There was no evidence against Allen's co-defen-
dants and as to them the suit was dismissed. Sir William
Kennedy, who tried the case, submitted three questions to
the jury, all of which they answered in the affirmative:
(I) "Did the defendant, Allen, maliciously induce the
Glengall Iron Company to discharge the plaintiffs or either
of them from their employment? (2) Did the defendant,
Allen, maliciously induce the Glengall Iron Company not
to engage the plaintiffs or either of them? (3) Was the
settlement of this dispute a matter within the discretion of
Allen ?'43 Judgment was given for the plaintiffs on these
findings, and this judgment was unanimously confirmed
by the Court of Appeal, 44 but finally reversed in the House
of Lords by a vote of six to three.
45
In looking at the acts of Allen we may regard them in
one of two lights. We may assume, that as the strike of
the Glengall Company's employes was certain unless Flood
and Taylor were discharged, Allen merely assumed the
roll of mutual friend or lover of peace, who gave the com-
pany a knowledge of the true state of affairs. Or we may
assume that, though Allen did not create the feeling against
the plaintiffs on the part of the Glengall Company's em-
ployes, he not only sympathized with the feeling, but was
willing to co-operate with them and add his efforts to theirs,
to induce the Glengali Company to discharge the plaintiffs.
If we look at his acts in the first light, we cannot think of
holding him liable, and if we find that the final judgment
of the House of Lords was reached because they put this
interpretation on the evidence, a case of less importance was
never taken to that tribunal. On the other hand, if we
regard the acts of Allen in the second light indicated, before
"Page 24. The meaning of the last question is not clear. It is not
discussed by the judges.
(1898) A. C. z.
(1895) 2 Q. B. p.:28.
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we can draw any conclusion as to the principle for which
the case stands, we must ask ourselves: Did Allen, with a
desire to injure the plaintiffs, induce the Glengall Com-
pany not to employ the plaintiffs by merely stating as a
matter of argument the fact over which he had no control,
namely, the threat of the strike; or did he do anything
to make that threat more effective? If the former inter-
pretation is to be put upon his acts the case stands for the
proposition, that A. can have no action against B., though
B., with a desire to injure A., persuaded C., by argument,
not to deal with A., even though one of the arguments used
was the recital of the fact that if he did not do as B. wished,
others would injure him in his business. On the other
hand, if we regard Allen as himself increasing the effective-
ness of the threat, the case stands for the much wider propo-
sition, that if B., with an intent to injure A., by threats of
business loss which he himself will aid in inflicting, induces
C. not to deal with A., A. has no action against B. In
short, the case answers in the negative our Fourth Question,
and in effect, though there was no combination charged,
overrules Temperton v. Russel. The differences of opinion
among the judges, and the mistaken conception of the scope
of the decision which exists among the profession, is due
in a large part to the fact, that some of those who took part
in the decision regarded Allen as an arguer, while others
regarded him as a threatener; that is one who himself was
willing and had the power to effectually assist in inflicting
the business injury, unless there was a compliance with his
demands.
It will be seen that if the position taken by Sir William
Brett, Lord Esher, in Bowen v. Hall, and in Temperton v.
Russel, is adopted, and the emphasis in these cases of inter-
ference in trade, is to be placed on the intent of the inducer,
it is an actionable wrong whether the inducer is a threatener
or not. To induce a person by argument not to enter into
a contract with another may not be actionable, but to induce
him for the purpose of injuring that other in his business
is actionable because done with a malicious intent. This is
the position of Sir William Kennedy, the trial judge.
48
'Page 37.
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It is immaterial from this point of view whether Allen
merely used the imminence of the strike as an argument, or
whether he actively assisted in making the threat a greater
reality. In either event he persuaded with the intent to
injure; with malice, and that is enough. The opinion of
Lord Esher in the Court of Appeal practically takes the
same position. Though he does say that Allen went to the
masters "to put pressure on them,"14 7 it is evident that
whether Allen by his acts did or did not increase the force of
the pressure is in his opinion immaterial. To him, the evi-
dence of Allen's undertaking to help to secure the discharge
of the plaintiffs is sufficient to maintain the action. "One
person," he says, "has a perfect right to advise another not
to make a particular contract, and that other is at perfect
liberty to follow that advice. But if the first person uses
the persuasion with the intent to injure the person with
whom he is going to make the contract, then the act is
malicious, and the malice makes that unlawful which would
otherwise be lawful."' 48 Sir Henry Lopes agreed with this
proposition. Sir John Rigby, the third judge in the Court
of Appeal, while he did not say that he disagreed with the
principle as stated, concurred without discussion because
he considered the question settled by Temperton v. Russel.49
As stated, the case was appealed to the House of Lords.
After the first argument, eight judges, Hawkins, Mathew,
Cane, North, Wills, Grantham, Lawrence and Wright, were
summoned to attend a second argument. At the close of
this second argument the following question was pro-
pounded to the judges, who had been summoned to assist:
"Assuming the evidence given by the plaintiffs' witnesses to
be correct, was there any evidence of a cause of action fit
to be left to a jury?"50
Six of the eight judges answered the question thus put
in the affirmative, two in the negative. Only one, however,
Sir Alfred Wills, distinctly affirms the proposition, that in




60 (1898) A. C. p. ii.
148 CASES ON TRADE AND LABOR DISPUTES.
which without this motive would be lawful.51 Sir Ford
North comes near to this idea by following the conception
elaborated by Sir Charles Bowen in the Mogul case; namely,
that the willful infliction of injury on another is actionable
unless done with just cause and excuse, and then taking the
position that the desire to injure the plaintiffs deprived
Allen of this just cause, which in the Mogul case was sup-
plied by the defendants' desire to advance their own busi-
ness.52  From this point of view, the desire to injure-the
malice-does not make the act wrongful. The doing of an
act which leads to harm is the foundation of the action; the
malice merely prevents an excuse which might otherwise
be pleaded. The only possible practical difference, however,
between this view and that expressed by Lord Esher and Sir
Alfred Wills, is, that where malice is regarded as the element
which makes the act wrongful no excuse is possible, while if
malice is but a reason for not excusing an act which is wrong-
ful unless excused, then other reasons may overcome the
malice and make an act lawful even though done with the
intent to injure. This was what happened in the Mogul case.
There was an intent to injure, but there was also an intent
on the part of the defendants to advance their own trade.
In Allen v. Flood there was an intent to injure, but there
was likewise an intent to secure for the boiler makers a
monopoly of iron work on ships. Taking, therefore, Sir
Ford North's own argument the conclusion from it would
seem to be, that the desire to secure the monopoly of the
export carrying trade is a lawful excuse for an otherwise
actionable injury, but the desire to secure for others the
monopoly of the trade of working on iron in ships, is not
a lawful excuse for such an injury. It is fair to the learned
judge to suppose that the distinction, not being of his own
making, he really disagreed with the decision in the Mogul
case. None of the other judges really make Allen's intent
to injure the foundation of their belief that the plaintiffs had
a cause of action. Sir Henry Hawkins thinks that the
evidence showed that Allen had the power to bring on a
strike, and that he threatened to do so unless the company
'1 Page 49.
"Page 42.
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discharged the plaintiffs. 3 From this view of the evidence
his opinion that the plaintiff showed a cause of action was
merely applying the decision in Temperton v. Russel to a
case which lacked the element of conspiracy, placing that
decision however, not only on the intent to injure, but on
the method employed to persuade the Glengall Company to
discharge the plaintiffs.
Sir William Grantham and Sir John Lawrence show that
they thought the plaintiffs' evidence proved that Allen will-
fully misrepresented his power to cause a strike, and caused
the injury through this willful misrepresentation. 54 In this
view of the evidence there could be no doubt of the liability
of the defendant. Sir Lewis Cave, the remaining judge to
answer the question put by the House of Lords in the affirm-
ative, does so on the ground that the defendant had know-
ingly trespassed on that subdivision of the rights of prop-
erty, known as the right to acquire property." From this
point of view it was alike unnecessary to discuss the means
employed to induce the Glengall Company to discharge
the plaintiffs, or the motive of Allen. Any act, the ordinary
consequence of which would be to interfere with this right
to acquire property, would be actionable. Thus this learned
judge announced a principle more sweeping than any of his
associates'. Under it, he who from a good motive by mere
argument induced one man not to deal with another would
seem to have committed an actionable wrong.
The two judges who gave negative replies to the inquiry,
Sir Robert Wright and Sir James Mathew, did so on the
express ground that they believed that a malicious motive,
where there is not express malice, that is the desire to
harm for harm's sake, can never make that unlawful
which would otherwise be lawful. 56 Sir James Mathew,
while he seems to have regarded Allen in the light of a man
who merely used the imminence of the strike as a reason
why the ,company should discharge the plaintiffs,5 7 does
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combination of employes to strike, unless the employer dis-
charged a co-laborer, would not give rise to a right of action
in the party injured. 8 Sir Robert Wright also seems to
take this position-a position which is directly opposed to
the decision on the second count in Temperton v. Russel,
-as he points out, that without malice the action of Allen
is not actionable, as he did not persuade the company to
break a contract with the plaintiffs, or do other unlawful
acts. 59
Thus, with a multitude of learned advice, which only
served to emphasize the different views which could be
taken of the evidence, and the conflict in existing judicial
opinion, not only as to the effect of the defendant's motive
in making his act wrongful, but as to the limits of legal
conduct in labor disputes, the case was taken up for final
decision by the members of the House of Lords. As stated,
of the nine judges who then took part in the decision, three
voted to confirm and six to reverse the Court of Appeal.
In order to ascertain exactly what the majority thought
they were deciding, it is first necessary to know how they
looked at the facts. An examination of their opinions
shows that five at least did not look upon the defendant,
Allen, as having either increased the feeling existing among
the Glengall Company's employes against the plaintiffs, or
as himself increasing the likelihood of a strike as a means
of persuading the company to discharge the plaintiffs.60
Lord Davey, the remaining member of the majority, prob-
ably looked at the facts in the same way;61 though as he
did not restate them, as each of the other judges did, this
cannot be positively asserted. Of course, the majority do
not deny that Allen used the certainty of the strike as an
argument why the two shipwrights should be discharged,
or that he went to the officers of the company to use these
arguments for the purpose of obtaining this discharge. In
view of this interpretation placed by the majority on the
" Page 27.
Page 62. See supra.
' The five judges are: Lords Macnaghten, pp. 147-148, 150-151;
Lord Herschell, pp. 115, i42; Lord Watson, pp. go, gi, 98; Lord Sand,
p. 161; Lord James, of Hereford, p. 176.
"' Page 172.
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evidence, the case, as one determining the limits of right
conduct by persons engaged in economic contests, cannot
stand for more than the proposition that: If B. persuades
C. by argument to abandon a contemplated contract with A.,
even though B. intended to injure A., and harm does as a
matter of fact result to A., A. has no action against B.
The case also stands for the principle that an act does
not become wrongful merely because it was done with the
intent to injure, unless perhaps the injury was the only
object of the act. All of those composing the majority
unite in maintaining this proposition, and for this cause,
if for no other, the case will always remain one of the most
important ever decided.62  It is practically impossible to
state whether those who dissented would or would not have
considered Allen's acts actionable, had they regarded the
facts in the same light as the majority. To them, however,
Allen did more than argue, he threatened and was himself
an active agent in increasing the coercion which led to the
discharge of the plaintiffs. In short, they regard the facts
of the case as presenting our fourth question, the threat of
business harm in order to prevent the third person dealing
with the plaintiffs, and they answer this question in the
affirmative.
6 3
Though there is nothing in the decision in Allen v. Flood
which involves a negative answer to our fourth question,
or a reversal of the judgment on the second count in Tent-
perton v. Russel, three of the majority go beyond what was
necessary in the case as they conceived the facts, to discuss
the question of the liability of the defendant, supposing that
he had created the threat of business loss which effectively
persuaded the company to discharge the plaintiffs, and they
come to the conclusion that even in this event the defendant
' The proposition in respect to malice may almost be said to have
received the unanimous opinion of the House of Lords. As two of the
three judges who dissented seem to go no further than Sir Charles
Bowen in the Mogul case, that is they regard malice, i. e., the intent to
injure, as taking away any just cause or excuse for the injury. For
their discussions of this subject see Lord Chancellor Halsbury, pp. 84,
85; Lord Ashbourne, p. x4. Lord Morris, the remaining dissenting
judge, does not discuss the question.
' See for this part of their respective opinions: Lord Herschell, pp.
129, 130; Lord Watson, p. 98; Lord Sand, 165.
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would not be liable, because it is lawful to put pressure on
a man to make him act in a legal manner, though the result
of his act is to injure a third person, provided the pressure
comes from threatening to do what you have a perfect right
to do. Thus in this view, while it would be illegal for Allen
to threaten physical harm to the property of the company
unless they .discharged the plaintiffs, and for the resulting
injury to them the plaintiffs in that case might have had an
action, merely to threaten to stop work, or that he would
have other people not under contract stop work, would be
to threaten to do what he or they had a right to do, and
would not, under the principle announced, give rise to any
cause of action. It will be seen that this is a direct negative
answer to our fourth question. In announcing this prin-
ciple and its application to the possible facts of the case,
Lord Sand expressly states that he is not dealing with a
combination to injure. This saving sentence prevents his
opinion from being a direct assertion that the second count
in Temperton v. Russel -should have been decided in favor
of the defendants.64 Lord Herschell, however, makes no
such reservation, and practically regards this part of Ter-
perton v. Russel as overruled. 65
It will easily be perceived that if the case of Allen v.
Flood really stood for the proposition contended for by at
least one-half of the majority, it would be a case, not only
of far-reaching importance on the subject of malice, but
it would be an equally important case on the subject of the
limit of right conduct in trade and labor disputes. The
profession generally interpreted the decision through Lord
Herschell's opinion. Thus the plaintiffs in Lyons v. Wilkins,
having proved at the trial the allegations which in the
motion for the preliminary injunction secured for them an
order restraining the defendants from withdrawing or
threatening to withdraw the workmen from a third person
unless the third person ceased to deal with the plaintiffs,
moved to make the judgment permanent. Sir E. W. Bryne,
considered that the judgment in Allen v. Flood showed that
the plaintiffs were not entitled to this injunction.66 In
" Page 168.
'Page 143.
" 78 L. T. 618, 1898. 61g; s. c., 67 L. J. Ch. 383.
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Huttley v. Simmons67 Sir Charles Darling held that, in view
of the decision, a combination of cabmen to prevent another
cabman from being employed as a cab-driver, did not give
the injured cab-driver a right of action against the combina-
tion.68 It was inevitable that the House of Lords would soon
be given an opportunity to decide whether they cared to
limit Allen v. Flood to the question actually decided on the
facts, as the majority interpreted those facts, or whether
they would extend the case to cover the larger principle
maintained by Lord Herschell. The opportunity arose when
the case of Quinn v. Leathem,6 9 in 19Ol, was appealed from
the Irish Court of Appeal.7 In this case the defendants
were the officers of a trade union of Belfast, registered as
the Journeyman Butchers and Assistants' Association. By
a rule of the association it was the duty of all members to
assist their fellow-unionists to obtain employment. The
plaintiff was a flesher, having a number of workmen in his
employ who were not members of the union. A meeting
of the union was called, at which the plaintiff was present.
He offered to pay the dues and fines of his workmen, if
they were admitted as members. He was told, however, by
the defendants and other members present at the meeting,
that they would not admit his workmen, and he was warned
that he must discharge his journeymen. He could have
complied with this request without breaking any contract,
as he employed the butchers by the week; but he refused.
To force him to comply, the union notified a person by
the name of Munce, a butcher, or, as we would call him, a
meat provision dealer, who had not any contract with the
(1898) i Q. B. i8i.
"So to the Scottish Court of Session, through Lord Kincairney, de-
cided the case of the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society v. Glas-
gow Fleshers' Trade Defence Association, 35 Scottish, L R. 645,
1898, on the Mogul case and Allen v. Flood. In the Scottish case the
defendants, who were an association of butchers, indicated to the cattle
salesmen that they would not buy at their sales if the salesmen per-
mitted persons representing the Co-operative Society to bid. The sales-
men in consequence refused to receive bids from the Co-operative
Society, and the latter brought an action against the Fleshers' Associa-
tion for the consequent injury. The case was dismissed.
" (igoi) A. C. 495.
(I899) 2 I. R. 667, reported under the name of Leathem v. Craig.
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plaintiff, but who was accustomed to take some thirty
pounds of meat every week from him, that if he continued
to deal with the plaintiff his workmen would go on strike.
In consequence of this threat, Munce stopped taking beef
from the plaintiff. The action was brought by the plain-
tiff against the defendants as officers of the union for
wrongful interference in his business. A verdict in favor
of the plaintiff was confirmed by the Irish courts, and finally,
on appeal by the defendant Quinn, by the unanimous judg-
ment of the House of Lords.
71
It will be observed that this case is indentical with that
made out on the second count in Ternperton v. Russel,
72
and that the court refuse to follow the apparent drift of
Allen v. Flood towards the reversal of the earlier case.
There would appear to be at least three possible grounds
for distinguishing the case before the court from Allen v.
Flood. This case contained the element of a combination
to injure; Allen v. Flood contained no such element. Again,
the majority in Allen v. Flood did not regard Allen as
creating the condition which practically coerced the Glen-
gall Company into discharging the plaintiffs; while in this
case there was no doubt that the defendants had conspired
to put pressure on Munce so as to force him not to deal
with the plaintiff. Lastly, in Allen v. Flood, Allen, though
he was not employed by the Glengall Company, acted for
those who were employed, because they believed that the
'The action was brought in 1896 and tried before Fitz Gibbon, L.
J. He told the jury that there must be proved a common purpose
among the defendants, a conspiracy to injure (1899) 2 I. R. p. 673.
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendants moved to
set this verdict aside. In the Queen's Bench Division, Andrews, J.,
held that Allen v. Flood, had decided that the acts of the defendants,
if done by an individual only, were not actionable, but that this was a
case of conspiracy (see ibid., p. 68o). To the same effect, O'Brien, J.
(see p. 69o), and Sir P. O'Brien, L. C. J. (see p. 726). Palles, C. B.,
dissented because he felt himself coerced by the judgment in Allen v.
Flood (see p. 7oi). The defendants appealed to the Irish Court of
Appeal. There the lords concurred in the opinion that the case could
be distinguished from Allen v. Flood on the ground of conspiracy.
(Lord Ashbourne, C., p. 751; Porter, M. R., p. 76o; Walker, L. J., 766;
Holmes, L. J., p. 774.) Only the defendant Quinn appealed to the
House of Lords
" (i893) 13 B. 715.
CASES ON TRADE AND LABOR DISPUTES.
presence of the defendants was an objectionable condition
of their employment, while in this case the defendants and
their associates had nothing to do with the plaintiff or his
workmen. In reference to the last distinction, though Lord
Macnaghten aid Lord Lindley both refer to the fact that
Leathem had no dispute with his men, none of the court
can be said to lay emphasis on this as the real basis for dis-
tinguishing the case before them from Allen v. Flood.
7
3
The judges really distinguish this case on one or both of the
other grounds of distinction which we have mentioned.
Thus Lord Macnaghten takes the position, though he does
not discuss the proposition at any length, that a conspiracy
to injure, resulting in damage gives rise to civil liability.
7 4
Lord Brampton maintains the same proposition, pushing it
to the logical conclusion that, once you have a conspiracy to
injure, an act done in the furtherance of the object of the
conspiracy becomes wrongful, though had it not been for
the conspiracy it would have been lawful.75 It need hardly
be pointed out that this position is directly contrary to that
taken by Lord Bowen in the Mogul case. As we pointed
out, Lord Bowen there took the position that the combina-
tion to be illegal must be a combination to do some act
which would injure the plaintiff without just cause or
excuse, and whether there is just cause or excuse is the same
question whether you have the act of one or of many.
76
This opinion was as we have seen at the time approved by
the House of Lords. Thus it may be said that the position
of those who placed Quinn v. Leathern on the ground of
"For Lord Macnaghten's reference to this phase of the case, see
page 511; for Lord Lindley's, page 536. Lord Shand does say, on page
514, that the vital distinction between Allen v. Flood and the present
case, is that in the former "the purpose of the defendant was by the
acts complained of to promote his own trade interest;" while in the
present case there was a combination to injure "as distinguished from
the intention of legitimately advancing their own interests." In view
of the facts of Allen v. Flood, the language of the learned judge is
almost unintelligible, unless we assume that he had in his mind the
existence in Allen v. Flood of a dispute between the Glengall Company
and their employes and that the act of Allen was in furtherance of the
employes' side of the dispute.
"4Page 510.
'" Page 529.
T23 Q. B. D. p. 617, I889.
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conspiracy to injure was directly contrary to the decision in
the Mogul case. There the acts of the defendant being
legal, were according to the majority legal, if done by one,
and the court held that they did not become illegal because
the immediate object was to drive the plaintiff out of busi-
ness, or because of a combination towards that end. Again,
if the position of Lord Brampton is to be persisted in, the
principle for which Allen v. Flood stands in respect to
intent is much curtailed. While the intent to injure may
not make an act of one illegal, which would be otherwise
legal, according to Lord Brampton's position, the intent
of many combining to do an act will make the act done
legal or illegal according to the nature of the intent.
All the judges, however, as we have intimated, did not
rest the case on the element of combination. Lord Chan-
cellor Halsbury points out that in Allen v. Flood "the
defendant neither uttered nor carried into effect any threat
at all," while in the case before the court, "there was con-
spiracy, threats, and threats carried into execution, so that
loss of business and interference with the plaintiff's rights
are abundantly proved. '7 7 Lord Lindley expands the same
general idea. He points out that the plaintiff "had a right
to earn his own living in his own way," and that the defend-
ants in what they did, interfered in the liberty of action of
the plaintiff's customers by putting the customers to all
the inconvenience they could without using violence. 78 He
disregards the element of combination, pointing out that
though it is improbable that one man could have done what
the defendants did, had he done so, "he would have com-
mitted a wrong towards the plaintiff for which the plain-
tiff could have maintained an action. ' 70 In other words,
he would here appear to make the action depend on the
infringement of the plaintiff's right, and the infringement
depend on the coercion of the will of the plaintiff's cus-
tomers by threats of business loss. This part of the opinion
of Lord Lindley is clear and shows apparently that he
would answer our fourth question in the affirmative.
Page 507.
Pages 534, 536, 537.
'"Page 537.
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In a subsequent part of his opinion, however, he throws
doubt on the inference that he regarded the coercion of the
will of the defendant's customers as the element, the exist-
ence of which made the act of the defendants wrongful.
We have in a note referred to the Scottish case of Co-
operative Society v. Glasgow Fleshers' Association.0 The
plaintiffs and defendants in that case were in a sense com-
petitors in trade. Lord Lindley himself states the essential
facts. He says: "In this case the butchers induced some
salesmen not to sell meat to the plaintiffs. The means
employed were to threaten the salesmen that if they con-
tinued to sell meat to the plaintiffs they, the butchers, would
not buy from the salesmen." '  And he adds: "There was
nothing unlawful in this;" his reason being that no one's
right was infringed, apparently because it was an act done
in competition. Though Lord Lindley does not pursue the
matter further, it would seem that he here reverts to the
idea of Sir Charles Bowen in the Mogul case; namely, that
where a deliberate injury is inflicted in the course of com-
petition, no fraud or violence being used, it is done with just
cause and excuse. This attitude makes him support the
action in the case before him on the theory, that where there
is no competition between the plaintiff and the defendant,
a deliberate injury inflicted, is inflicted without this just
cause or excuse. Or we may put the point in another way.
The plaintiff in Quinn v. Leathem had a right to be pro-
tected from deliberate injury through interference with the
free will of his customers, unless this deliberate injury was
inflicted with just cause and excuse. Competition would
supply this just cause; but Leathem was not competing in
business with the defendants, and the defendants had no
other just cause and excuse for their acts. If we are cor-
rect in this interpretation of Lord Lindley's opinion, he
does not answer our fourth question in the affirmative,
without serious qualification. He practically maintains that
A. has a right of action against B., if B. by threats of busi-
ness loss induces C. not to enter into a contract he would
otherwise enter into with A., unless A. and B. are com-
See supra, note.
n Page 539.
158 CASES ON TRADE AND LABOR DISPUTES.
petitors in business or labor, in which case, under the cir-
cumstances indicated, A. does not have an action against B.
In view of the differences noted in the points of view
of the judges who decided Quinn v. Leathern, it is improper
to assert that the case stands for any principle other than
that necessarily induced from the facts. We can say no
more than that a combination of two or more persons to
injure another who is not a business rival, by threatening
to inflict business harm on third persons if they continue to
deal with him, gives rise to a legal cause of action by the
person injured against the combination.
In conclusion it may be profitable to sum up the extent
to which the cases we have discussed have answered our
four questions, and to indicate the principal points still
unsettled. That our first question, whether A. has an action
against B. if B. by the offer of something of value induces
C. to break a contract with A., is answered in the affirma-
tive, there can be no question. But it is interesting to note
that whether it is actionable if B. accomplishes his object
by mere argument is yet doubtful. Though no case has
answered our second question, viz., whether A. would have
an action, if B. induced the breach by threats of business
loss, there would appear to be no doubt that an action for
an injury inflicted in this way could be maintained; indeed,
this is assumed in Quinn v. Leathern. Our third question,
which raised the case of B. persuading C. by the offer of
something of value not to deal with A., the Mogul case
seemed at the time to decide in the negative. But the
recent opinion of Lord Lindley, and indeed perhaps the
opinion of Sir Charles Bowen in the case itself, would tend
to confine the negative answer to cases where A. and B.
were competitors in business, and we may, therefore, fairly
consider it doubtful whether or not A. has an action against
B. if B., not being a competitor in business of A.'s, offers
C. "something of value" if C. will not make the contract
which he contemplates making with A.8 2 The extent to
"There may of course be other just causes beside "competition." The
desire to benefit C. might be a just cause. The desire to injure A. would
not be a just cause; but it will be readily seen that if this line of devel-
opment is pursued there will soon be nothing left of Allen v. Flood as
an authority on malice.
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which Quinn v. Leathem answers our Fourth Question in
the affirmative need not be restated, but it may be pointed
out that under this question the following cases have yet
to be determined: If B., not in combination with others,
threatens C. with business loss if he makes the contract
which he expects to make with A., has A. an action against
B., (I) Where A. and B. are competitors? (2) Where A.
and B. are not competitors? (3) Where B. has combined
with others, A. and B. being competitors? Again, in view of
the fact that in Quinn v. Leathern there was no dispute
between Leathem and his own employes, and that this fact
was adverted to by more than one of the judges, it may yet
be considered doubtful whether a combination of a number
of a man's employes to strike unless he discharges a co-
employe, by which combination the co-employe is dis-
charged, gives rise to a legal cause of action in the dis-
charged employe, against the members of the combination,
the employer, not having been induced to commit a breach
of contract?
It is not, however, the number of important and perfectly
possible states of fact, the legal import of which has not
been determined, which makes the subject of responsibility
for the interference in the trade relations of others one of
doubt and difficulty; it is rather the fact that in the solution
of each case which has arisen there are several distinct ten-
dencies, or methods by which this class of cases can be
decided, no one of which has as yet become dominant. In
Lord Esher, for instance, we have the tendency to ascertain
the legality or illegality of the act of the defendant by the
character of his intent. This tendency received a most
decided check in Allen v. Flood, but the opinion of Lord
Brampton in Quinn v. Leathem shows that the tendency is
not finally eradicated. The opinion of Lord Bowen in the
Mogul case, exhibits two other tendencies; one, that towards
testing the legality of the defendant's act by ascertaining
the nature of the act which he induced the third person to
do, whether it was or was not itself a civil wrong to the
plaintiff; the other, the tendency to ascertain the extent of
the rights of the plaintiff as a trader, and then to ask
whether the defendant trespassed on these rights. This
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last attitude is usually modified by treating the rights of a
trader, as a sort of quasi property right; that is, as a right
which cannot be trespassed on, except with just cause and
excuse, the just cause or excuse being found in the exercise
by the defendant of similar rights. Lastly, we have the
tendency to test the legality or illegality of the interference,
by the method employed to induce the third person to break
off his business relations with the plaintiff. This attitude
is seen in Lord Herschell's opinion in Allen v. Flood, where
he declares that Allen's threat, if he made a threat, cannot
give rise to an action, because in striking, the Glengall
Company's employes would not have done a civil wrong to
the company. It is seen also in Lord Lindley's and Lord
Chancellor Halsbury's opinions in Quinn v. Leathem, where
they regard the coercion of the wills of the plaintiff's
customers as a test of the wrongfulness of the defendants'
acts.
As stated, we cannot yet tell which tendency will prevail.
Until one tendency does prevail, it will be impossible to
foretell with any certainty what will be the decision in any
case, in which the adoption of one principle or test of legality
rather than another would lead to different results. It is
the opinion of the writer that in time the test of legality
will be the last one indicated, that is the character of the
methods employed to induce. He reaches this conclusion
principally because it appears to him to be the marked char-
acteristic of the development of the law of torts, that it
always shows a tendency to reach out towards an objective
standard of right conduct, and that the only other test
besides the last which meets this requirement,-the nature
of the act persuaded,-fails to meet any form of coercion
which stops short of threatened violence to person or prop-
erty; and it will probably be generally admitted that the
capacity which the modern man has for industrial organi-
zation of all kinds would seem to indicate, that persuasion
by business pressure is a new form of coercion from which
the law must protect all classes of society.
William Draper Lewis.
